The potential use of reliability growth curves in management of weapon systems by Anderson, Ronald G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1976-09
The potential use of reliability growth curves in
management of weapon systems
Anderson, Ronald G.















The Potential Use of Reliability
Growth Curves in




Thesis Advisor: J. W. Creighton
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,
11779k!

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whon Data Snfr»d)
_
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE NAVAL PCoTGP READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
t. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMSER
4. TITLE (and Subtltlm)
The Potential Use of Reliability Growth
Curves in Management of Weapon Systems
S. TYPE OF REPORT 4 PERIOO COVERED
Master's Thesis;
September 1976
• • PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMSER
7. AUTHORf»>
Ronald G. Anderson
• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*,)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
52




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ot thia Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of tha mbatrmct antarad In Block 30. II dlllarant /ram Raport)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on rewerae »ida II nacaaaary and Identity by block nuanbar)
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on rararaa aim* II neceeamty and identity by block member)
This paper explores the potential use of Reliability Growth
Curves as a means by which the program manager can monitor and
measure the reliability growth of a weapon system. The present
reliability policies associated with weapon system acquisition
are reviewed. Examination of three weapon system's Request for
Proposals show how these policies are implemented. MIL-STD 785A,




EDITION OF 1 NOV 61 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014-6601 |
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data tntared)

futuWITV CLASSIFICATION OF TmiS P»GEf»^.n n»r« Enfr»J
reviewed and is followed by a discussion of the weaknesses of
today's policies. This sets the stage for the presentation of
the proposed method that will enable the program manager to con-
trol the reliability growth of new weapon systems.
DD Form 1473
1 Jan 73
S/N 0102-014-6601 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOEHWitn D*f gnffd)

The Potential Use of Reliability
Growth Curves in
Management of Weapon Systems
by
Ronald G. Anderson
General Engineer, Pt. Mugu, California
B.S., Northrup Institute of Technology, 1963
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of




This paper explores the potential use of Reliability Growth
Curves as a means by which the program manager can monitor and
measure the reliability growth of a weapon system. The present
reliability policies associated with weapon system acquisition
are reviewed. Examination of three weapon system's Request for
Proposals show how these policies are implemented. MIL-STD
785A, which provides the guidelines for reliability programs,
is also reviewed and is followed by a discussion of the weak-
nesses of today's policies. This sets the stage for the pre-
sentation of the proposed method that will enable the program
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Programs for the acquisition of weapon systems are con-
stantly facing new challenges. This is the result of infla-
tion, rising costs and pressures both from Congress and the
public. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States in 1974, states [1]:
"The rising concern of the Congress and the public about
increasing costs of new defense weapons is certainly not
news. The patience of the public and the Congress has
been worn thin by repeated experiences with contractor
and Defense Department cost forecasts for new weapons
that are unrealistic, and the promises of performance
miracles by new weapons that later proved unattainable."
In addition, today's defense strategies and tactics,
designed to meet the rapidly changing international situations,
require weapon systems of increasing complexity which demand
an increase in the performance requirements and environmental
operating conditions. This requirement for complex weapon
systems has created a technology explosion which threatens to
doom systems under development to technical obsolescence
before they become operational. These problems were cited in
1972 by former Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard [2]:
"Cost overruns were the most visible symptoms of the
troubled new weapon development situation but there were
other problems too. Most programs took far too long from
original conception until weapons were delivered to the
operational military forces. As a result, many weapons,
particularly those involving electronics and other fast-
moving technology, were out of date by the time they were
available.
"
To compound the problem, even after exorbitantly high cost
and unnecessarily long development time, many of the new

devices did not have the reliability that is needed for mili-
tary use.
With these various factors affecting the acquisition of
weapon systems, how does one achieve a highly reliable weapon
system? Management in the Department of Defense and contrac-
tors have increased their efforts to improve the reliability
of weapon systems. However, despite these efforts, the reli-
ability of weapon systems continues to be disappointing.
Studies throughout the Department of Defense have been and
continue to be made in an effort to find ways to improve
reliability.
In May 19 72, the ."Mean Time Between Failure" Improvement
Study Group, headed by RADM K. R. Wheeler, SC USN, conducted
a major study for the Navy on reliability and maintainability
improvement. The resulting report, better known as the
"Wheeler Report" [3 ] concluded that those equipments found
unreliable in the fleet simply did not have reliability
designed in from the beginning. The report cited the follow-
ing specific conditions existing in 1972 which were considered
to be crucial factors influencing reliability in Navy acquisi-
tion efforts.
Sufficient time and dollars omitted from budgetary
submissions
Unenforcible reliability goals in contracts and no
enforcible reliability requirements
Poor or nonexistent reliability testing procedures
Insufficient reporting systems to identify unreliable
equipments in the fleet
Pressure for attaining specified performance goals
which lead to trade-offs that though not explicit,
aggregate to lower reliability

Poor documentation of trade-offs between reliability
and performance
In 19 7 3 the Air Force also conducted a study [4] in which
they found 37 possible deficiencies that could affect reli-
ability of the weapon systems. The following is a listing of
those that have a relation to the acquisition of weapon
systems
:
Contractor has no incentive to overdesign reliability
in equipment
No provisions made for reliability growth during
development
Changes in mission profiles of operational equipment
Operational equipment used in environments for which
they were not designed
Contract reliability requirements changed to goals
or not enforced
As a result of these Governmental studies, new reliability
policies were issued. One emphasis being that quantitative
reliability requirements will be stated in "Request for Pro-
posals" (RFP) . The policies further state that these require-
ments will be minimum acceptable, realistic and achievable.
The effects of these new policies are still questionable. In
the article "Improving R&D Management Through Prototyping,"
David Packard states [5]:
"A serious problem that troubles all of our recent major
programs is reliability. Numerous directives, specifica-
tions, and other requirements have been placed on all
major development programs to attempt to improve the reli-
ability of new weapons. Very little improvement, if any,
has come from this effort and very large sums of money
have been spent.
"Reliability cannot be achieved by adhering to detailed
specifications. Reliability cannot be achieved by formula
or by analysis. Some of these may help to some extent but
there is only one road to reliability. Build it, test it,
and fix the things that go wrong. Repeat the process until
the desired reliability is achieved. It is a feedback pro-
cess and no other way."

B. PURPOSE
Reliability has become an issue of major concern in the
acquisition of new weapon systems and today's reliability
policies do not provide the program manager with the needed
visibility during the weapon system's development. The pur-
pose of this paper is to propose a method by which the program
manager can monitor and measure the reliability growth of the
weapon system as it proceeds through its life cycle from
initial design to the end of development.
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II. WHY A RELIABILITY PROGRAM
One of the major forces that demands a reliability program
is the ever increasing cost of weapon systems. This is well
recognized by the Department of Defense as evident by their
emphasis on the "Design to Cost" concept of which reliability
is an essential element. This is further amplified by
CDR Hollister, USN, and R. Shorey of the Office of the Assist-
ant Director (Electronics) [6]:
"In design to a cost development, reliability and maintain-
ability are especially important considerations. There is
concern that a developer, motivated to provide the highest
level of system performance possible at a target cost, may
implicitly trade reliability and maintainability for greater
performance. .
.
"Minimum reliability and maintainability requirements are
established along with other minimum acceptable performance
specifications. These are treated as major system perform-
ance parameters during performance verification."
In his book "Reliability Mathematics," Bertram L. Amstradter
states [ 7]
:
"The importance of obtaining highly reliable systems and
components has been recognzied in recent years. From a
purely economic viewpoint, high reliability is desirable
to reduce overall costs. The disturbing fact that the
yearly cost of maintaining some military systems in an
operable state has been as high as ten times the original
cost of the equipment emphasizes this need. .
.
"The need for and importance of reliability have been
reflected in the constantly increasing emphasis placed on
reliability by both government and commercial industry."
Other factors that demand reliability improvement are
safety, schedule delays, inconvenience, and combat effective-
ness in the fleet. Willis J. Willoughby, Deputy Chief of




"The Navy, like other Military Services, is faced with
less-than-desired combat effectiveness levels and rising
life cycle costs. This situation exists because reli-
ability has not been properly specified and pursued;





III. PRESENT RELIABILITY POLICIES
A. POLICIES
Various instructions that have been issued provide the
best overview of the present policies governing reliability
and the acquisition of weapon systems.
1. SECNAVINST 5000.
1
SECNAVINST 5000.1, System Acquisition in the Depart-
ment of the Navy, was issued in March 19 72 and contains as
Enclosure (1), DOD Directive 5000.1. This instruction now
establishes all major policy and management principles for
the acquisition of weapon systems. In spite of the fact that
reliability is now a major issue in the acquisition of weapon
systems, no reference to reliability can be found in the 40
pages of this instruction. In Section II, Conduct of Program,
reference is made to Enclosure (4) of the instruction which
is a list of applicable documents. This list contains no more
than 56 different instructions that have some bearing on the
acquisition of weapon systems. Buried in this list is
SECNAVINST 3900. 36A, which is the instruction governing Reli-
ability and Maintainability.
2. SECNAVINST 3900. 33A
SECNAVINST 3900. 33A, Initiation of Engineering and
Operation Systems Development, was issued in September 19 68.
This instruction established the Navy policies for the acqui-
sition of weapon systems during the Conceptual Formulation
and Contract Definition phases. The following statements
pertaining to reliability were contained in this instruction:
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System Trade-offs: Trade-offs will be used to obtain
optimum balance between total cost, schedule, and oper-
ational effectiveness (reliability) for the system.
Conceptual Phase: Quantitative reliability and maintain-
ability goals and demonstration concepts.
Engineering Development: Quantitative reliability and
maintainability specifications for the system and major
subsystems and proposed test plans to demonstrate their
achievement.
This instruction has been superseded with the issuance of
SECNAVINST 5000.1.
3. OPNAVINST 5000. 42A
OPNAVINST 5000. 42A, Weapon Systems Selection and
Planning, was issued in March 1976. This instruction estab-
lishes the policies for identifying operational requirements
(OR) and conducting management reviews during system acquisi-
tion. The instruction makes only two references to reliability,
One being that reliability is to be considered in establishing
system performance goals. The second reference is the follow-
ing statement:
From the outset, planning will accord high priority to
simplicity in design and toughness of management, including
trade-offs and contractual provisions, to ensure a high
degree of reliability and maintainability.
4. SECNAVINST 3900. 36A
SECNAVINST 3900. 36A, Reliability and Maintainability
(R & M) for Naval Material, was issued in June 1970. This
instruction establishes the R & M policies for the Navy and
assigns responsibility for its achievement. With regards to
the acquisition of weapon systems, the following is found in
this instruction:
Basic Concept: Reliability techniques are based on the fact
that failure will occur and they focus attention on means
to minimize the effect of failure. The required R & M is
14

justified in that it supports mission requirements.
Therefore, it must be considered throughout the life
cycle of the system.
Policy: During the conceptual and development phases of
new systems, each program will include a minimum acceptable
R & M value based on operational need. A specified confi-
dence level is normally required for the R & M demonstration
Responsibilities
:
a. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for;
Ensure that requirements documents include numerical R & M
requirements and "Goals" or "Objectives" shall not be used
in lieu of R & M requirements.
Evaluate proposed decreases in R & M requirements for impact
on operational characteristics where development is unable
to economically achieve R & M minimum values.
b. The Chief of Naval Material is responsible for;
Ensure that quantitative R & M requirements are responded
to in proposal for industry.
Determine adequacy of each contractor's R & M program for
achieving and demonstrating R & M requirements.
B. REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS
To obtain a first hand knowledge of how these policies
are implemented, three Request for Proposals (RFP) were
reviewed.
1. Harpoon Weapon System [9]
a. Reliability Standards listed
(1) MIL-STD 721: Definition of Effectiveness Terms
(2) MIL-STD 756: Reliability Prediction
(3) MIL-STD 781: Reliability Tests
(4) MIL-STD 785: Reliability Program Plan
(5) MIL-STD 1304A: Reliability Reports
(6) MIL-R-22732: Reliability Requirement for
Shipboard and Ground Electrical
Equipment
b. Reliability Section
(1) Definition: A definition for reliability was
provided in the RFP and it was the one cited in MIL-STD 721.
15

(2) Reliability Requirements: The requirements
stated in the RFP were of two types, a reliability probability
and a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) . Numerical numbers
were stated, however, in the listing below only the reliability
probability (R) or the MTBF will be noted.

























The RFP further amplifies the requirements by providing the
following:
Missile Freeflight Reliability: They shall have
a freeflight reliability of R2 as a design objective and R^
as a minimum acceptable value. The missile shall be able to
operate under a degraded mode. Free- flight is defined as the
missile profile from launch to target intercept.
Aircraft Equipment Reliability: Each new item of
equipment for aircraft command and launch shall have a MTBF
(numerically specified) design goal and a MTBF (numerically
specified) minimum acceptable value.
Shipboard Equipment Reliability:
statement as for the aircraft equipment.
Same type of
(3) Reliability Program Plan: With regards to
a reliability program plan, the RFP states the following:
The contractor shall provide and maintain a reli-
ability program that is acceptable to the government.
The contractor shall use design techniques
described in paragraph 5.2.1 of MIL-STD 785A to the extent
practicable during the design phase to assure that the reli-




The contractor shall conduct a reliability analysis
of the Harpoon Weapon System during the design phase in accord-
ance with paragraph 5.2.2 and all subparagraphs of MIL-STD 785A.
2. VFAX Airborne Weapon System [10]
a. Reliability Standards listed
(1) MIL-STD 721: Definition of Effectiveness Terms
(2) MIL-STD 756: Reliability Prediction
(3) MIL-STD 785: Reliability Program Plan
b. Reliability Section
(1) Reliability Requirements: Quantitative
requirements are stated for two phases of the weapon system.
Mission reliability: The mission reliability,
expressed as the probability that the Airplane Weapon System
can perform all the mission functions successfully, shall equal
or exceed O.XX as a goal.
Refly reliability: The refly reliability, expressed
as the probability that the Airplane Weapon System can be re-
turned to full operating capability without corrective main-
tenance between missions, shall equal or exceed O.XX based on
a t-hour mission duration with O.XX as a goal.
(2) Reliability Program Plan: The request for
proposal states that a reliability program will be established
in accordance with MIL-STD 785 and the reliability specifica-
tion appendix of the request for proposal. The appendix pro-
vides amplification of various sections of MIL-STD 785 and
in some cases specific instructions as to how and what will
be included in the program.
A section of the reliability specification
appendix states what testing is required demonstrating the
reliability of the weapon system. The tests are classified
in two categories, preproduction and quality conformance.
The preproduction test is to determine if the
Airplane Weapon System has met the quantative reliability
requirements. Whereas, the quality conformance test is to
determine if the Airplane Weapon System offered for acceptance
has met the quantitative reliability requirements.
3. AEGIS Weapon System [11]
a. Reliability Standards listed
(1) MIL-STD 721: Definition of Effectiveness Terms
(2) MIL-STD 756: Reliability Prediction
(3) MIL-STD 781: Reliability Tests
17

(4) MIL-STD 785: Reliability Program Plan
(5) MIL-R 22732: Reliability Requirements for
Shipboard and Ground Electrical
Equipment
b. Reliability Section
(1) Definitions: The RFP provides definitions
for System Effectiveness , Inherent Availability and Operational
Availability.
(2) Reliability Requirements: The requirements
stated in the RFP are of two types, those being availability
and reliability.
Shipboard System Availability: The minimum accept-
able shipboard system inherent availability shall be at least
O.XXX over a t-month deployment period under the following
conditions
:
(a) The system will be in the standby or
operate mode of operation at least 75 percent of the time.
(b) The MFAR radar is to be considered a
primary search radar.
(c) The system is considered available when;
It is down for preventive maintenance, provided the capability
to return to full operation within t-minutes is retained.
Five out of six illuminators are available and remainder of
the system segments are providing specified performance.
Shipboard System Reliability: The MTBF for the
system, including test sets and built-in monitoring devices,
but excluding missiles shall be not less than t-hours
.
(3) Reliability Program Plan: The reliability
program plan requirement has been divided into three phases.
CD Phase A : The contractor shall submit as part
of his proposal a Preliminary Reliability and Maintainability
Plan identifying the work to be performed during Engineering
Development (ED) and its relationships to and expected impact
on the designs formulation process.
CD Phase B : The contractor shall, during this
phase, expand the plan into a comprehensive program for execu-
tion during engineering development. This program plan shall
comply with requirements of MIL-STD 785 and MIL-STD 4 70. The
plan shall present detailed procedures by which reliability
and maintainability will be measured, evaluated, and con-
trolled throughout ED.
ED Phase : The contractor shall develop a Produc-
tion R & M Plan. This plan shall establish and describe
those detailed procedures by which inherent R & M character-
istics are monitored and retained during production.
18

The RFP further breaks down the reliability pro-
gram to detailed task requirements as follows:





Parts and Materials Selection and Control
Parts Qualification
Reliability Quality Assurance
R & M Data Reporting, Analysis and Feedback
Design Qualification Tests
Acceptance Tests
(4) Policies: To obtain maximum availability
without sacrificing any of the high performance requirements,
the following policies have been set forth:
Maximum utilization of proven components--the
design trade-offs must favor proven reliability over potential
savings in weight, space or costs of unproven components.
Standardization—Standardization of components,
printed circuit cards, modules and subassemblies must be
maximized.
Redundancy and Fault isolators— the system design
must be optimized for maximum reliability and minimum down
time through the use of redundancy, automatic systems monitor-
ing and simplified fault isolators.
C. MIL-STD 785A
Title: Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment
Development and Production.
Purpose: To establish uniform criteria for a reliability
program and provide guidelines for the preparation and imple-
mentation of a reliability program.
Outline: This standard provides guidelines as to what
shall be included in a reliability program plan. Major head-
ings that are to be in this program plan are:
Reliability Management
Reliability Design and Evaluation






As one reviews these various sections of the MIL-STD, it
is noted that the context is in generalities and no specific
detailed guidance is given. In the Program Review section
(5.1.4) and the Design Review sections (5.2.7), it states that
progress will be reviewed at appropriate stages of development
and production to evaluate achievement of the reliability
requirements. However, no information is given as to how the
progress will be monitored or to what criteria it is to be
measured against, other than the numerical requirement (which
is the number to be achieved at the end of development)
.
D . SUMMARY
A review of the policies has shown that very little guid-
ance is given in terms of reliability and the acquisition of
a weapon system. Guidance can be summed up in the following
statement:
A minimum acceptable numerical requirement and a Reliability
Program requirement will be stated in the RFP
.
The three RFP's that were reviewed showed that this is
exactly what was stated. As to the completeness and detail
of the requirements, this depends upon the program manager
who is responsible for the context of the RFP, as can be seen
by the variance in the RFP's. In each of the RFP's, three to
six military standards are referenced, but only one (MIL-STD
785A) is cited in the reliability section. In the VFAX and
AEGIS RFP's, additional detail is given to supplement MIL-
STD 785A. However, there is no information given in any of
the three RFP's as to how the reliability of the system will
20

be monitored or measured during its development. As noted in
the review of MIL-STD 785A, which is cited in all the RFP • s
,
no information is contained as to monitoring or measurement
of reliability during development.
21

IV. MANAGEMENT AND RELIABILITY GROWTH
A. INTRODUCTION
"Reliability Prediction" can be defined as an estimate of
the performance we can expect of the equipment on its origi-
nally scheduled delivery date.
It is essential in treating the subject of reliability to
understand basic concepts relating to techniques for predic-
tion and control of reliability. The following contributions
from persons knowledgeable in the field are intended to pro-
vide this understanding.
"The formal process of Reliability Prediction is based on
the exponential distribution of random, statiscally inde-
pendent failures, occurring as a result of some inherent
nonsystematic propensity of things to fail. The mathematics
associated with this process requires that failure rates of
each constituent item be known and constant with time. The
resulting failure rate "prediction" is independent of time.
This is a fatal flaw, because we observe achieved failure
rate to be a function of time. That being the case, the
prediction can only represent an ultimate limiting value.
Such a value might be of some use if it could be depended
upon, but it cannot, because performance is exceeding pre-
dicted values every day...
"The numbers game has outlived its usefulness to the point
of severely interfering with our ability to do the real
job. In today's explosive development of new parts, and
equipment of astonishing capability—where successive models
are each a new generation of development—classical reli-
ability prediction is nearly useless: The numbers it pro-
duces are rarely relevant to the solution of any of our
problems." (Ernest Codier, General Electric Co.) [12]
"Many popular techniques for the analysis of reliability
consider the problem only at a single point in time. Such
techniques certainly yield value information. However, a
complete treatment of system reliability requires careful
consideration of the time variations introduced by design
changes or modifications in maintenance practices."
(J. T. Duane, General Electric Co.) [13]
22

"Experience has shown that reliability values reported from
field service are generally lower—often much lower—than
those predicted by design analysis or demonstrated by labor-
atory testing. This has led to optimistic projections of
operational effectiveness and ownership cost. It can also
lead managers down a "primrose path" during development/
since predictions and demonstrations indicate that reli-
ability requirements are being met." (Robert Parker, Deputy
Director Defense Research and Engineering) [14]
"...Despite special management efforts and major techno-
logical improvements/ Air Force avionics equipment still
does not demonstrate high reliability. This shortcoming
is compounded by the fact that the reliability predictions
which are formulated during equipment design / refined during
development, and tested during formal laboratory demonstra-
tions/ infer equipment reliability that is often signifi-
cantly greater than what is actually achieved when the
equipment is operationally employed." (Lt Gen Robert Marsh,
USAF/ Vice Commander, Air Force Systems Command) [15]
As noted by the various comments, the conventional reli-
ability analysis techniques, in particular "reliability pre-
diction/" are not providing the desired reliability in weapon
systems. Reliability prediction provides a useful data point.
However/ it is being used in dealing with time and design
changes, but it does not provide the manager with a useful
tool to monitor the reliability growth of the weapon system
during its development. In the implementation of the present
reliability policies (Section III) , the manager is in the dark
as to the reliability of the weapon system until development
is completed. In order to insure that the weapon system reli-
ability will meet the contractual requirement, the program
manager must have some type of yardstick by which he can
visually measure the reliability growth of the weapon system
during development. This yardstick must also provide inform-
ation as to when design changes are required/ and when the
system has met its contractual requirement. Barlow states:
23

"It is common practice, during the development of a system
to make engineering changes as the program develops . These
changes are generally made in order to correct design defici-
encies and, thereby, to increase reliability. This elimina-
tion of design weaknesses is what we mean by reliability
growth." [17]
To summarize the above, reliability growth is that growth
observed in reliability as the weapon system progresses along
its life cycle. A visual representation is presented in
Figure 1.
B. THE YARDSTICK
Present policy requires that a reliability program be
established for a new weapon system in accordance with MIL-
STD 785A. This military standard provides for a sound reli-
ability program for the attainment of the reliability require-
ment. However, it does not provide the means to monitor or
measure the reliability growth of the weapon system. It is
proposed that a "Reliability Growth Curve Prediction" be con-
tractually imposed as part of the Reliability Program Plan to
provide the means to monitor and measure reliability.
C. RELIABILITY GROWTH CURVE
1. What is It ? Amstradter states:
"...reliability growth is, in reality, a discrete function
which occurs, hopefully, each time a design change is
made. [16]
2. Is It New ?
Reliability growth is not new. Much has been written
about it, as can be noted in Appendix A, Bibliography on
Reliability Growth. It has only been in recent years that it



















management tool. Although the major emphasis has been only
to monitor reliability growth during development testing
,
more thought is being given to use it as a forecasting
method.
A reliability growth model is an analytic tool useful
in determining the time required to develop an acceptable
product. The model monitors the progress of the develop-
ment program and can be used to forecast the time required
to achieve the reliability goal if the program were to be
modified. [18]
This technique should be useful to the reliability
engineer in the monitoring of development progress to
insure that reliability specification requirements are
achieved. A further desirable characteristic would be
for techniques to provide for continuing extrapolation
from current status to some future result... This tech-
nique is known as reliability growth curve methodology. [19]
3. Two Types of Growth Curves
Reliability growth curves can be classified into two
categories; Assessment and Apportionment [20].
a. Assessment—When reliability-growth equations and
curves are prepared after a program is well into the develop-
ment phase and thereby utilize actual test data to arrive at
appropriate numerics, growth analysis becomes primarily an
assessment process.
b. Apportionment— If a growth curve is prepared to
depict expected levels of reliability achievement and to pro-
vide a continuum of time-oriented goals, it can be classed as
an apportionment procedure.
4. Models
There are several reliability growth models, each of
which is valid in its own right. The purpose of this paper
is not to present the various models and how to apply them,
26

but to show that reliability growth curves have a place in
management. However, to acquaint the reader with reliability
growth models, Appendix B provides a review.
5. The Purpose of Reliability Growth Models
The use of reliability growth curves has several
potential purposes. They include:
a. Monitoring the reliability progress of the system
as it proceeds through development.
b. If a reliability growth curve was predicted, it
provides a means to measure the actual growth of the system.
c. It provides for forecasting of reliability in the
short term.
d. Provides the means to measure the effectiveness
of design changes.
e. Aids in defining design problems and what their
impact on reliability will be.
f. Aids in the allocation and reallocation of resources
to achieve requirements on schedule and within constraints.
g. Aids in determining requirements for future
procurements
.
h. Provides a useful communication vehicle for high
1 eve 1 management
.
i. Aids in planning the development program and to
control its progress as the design matures.
6. Is It Applicable ?
The best method to show the applicability of reli-
ability growth curves is to cite several examples. The
27

examples will be divided into the two categories of reliability
growth modeling; assessment and apportionment,
a. Assessment Examples
(1) F-15A Aircraft [21]. The reliability program
for the F15A did not call for reliability growth modeling.
The reliability requirements were typical of today's policies,
i.e., MTBF and a reliability program plan. As part of the
reliability program, data were collected, analyzed and plotted.
This plotted data (Figure 2) shows the reliability growth of
the aircraft during development testing.
It should be noted that the growth curve is
not continuous from Category I (contractor evaluation) to
Category II (Air Force evaluation) . The major contributing
factor for this discontinuity is the change in operational
environment. This is one of the considerations that must be
recognized in using reliability growth modeling.
(2) TOW Weapon System [22]. The TOW weapon sys-
tem is a heavy assault weapon for the U. S. Army. The reli-
ability requirements for this program were based on present
day policies. However, a strong emphasis was stressed in the
"find and fix" and "overstress" test approach to reliability.
Although reliability growth modeling was not a contractual
requirement, a plot of reliability growth was maintained
throughout the program (Figure 3) .
(3) F-111A Aircraft [23]. The reliability pro-
gram for the U. S. Air Force F-111A aircraft was conducted
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were obtained, a rigorous reliability program was imposed on
the contractor. Reliability growth prediction was not part
of this program; however, data were plotted to show the reli-
ability growth of the aircraft during its development (Figure
4) .
b. Apportionment Examples
(1) C-141 Aircraft [24]. The U. S. Air Force
reliability requirement for the C-141 was as follows: The
contractor shall plan and conduct a comprehensive reliability
program in accordance with the requirements of Weapon Systems
Specification MIL-R-26674 , Reliability Requirements for Wea-
pon Systems.
Although the Air Force did not specify a
numerical reliability requirement, the contractor established
a design goal and performed a prediction analysis to show
projected growth to this goal. As the program progressed,
predictions were continually updated which resulted in adjust-
ment to the growth curve (Figure 5) . As the program progressed
through development, observed growth was plotted against the
predicted growth curve (Figure 6) . This visual representa-
tion served as a basis for program reviews and direction for
the contractor and the Air Force.
(2) SATCOM Terminals [25]. Reliability growth
prediction was not imposed as a contractual requirement, but
the Army used the Duane and Weibull reliability growth models
to make reliability management decisions. These growth
models helped to plan the growth of reliability in the develop-
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The authors of this article summed up the use of this technique
in the following statement:
"The Duane and Weibull growth curves were used to deter-
mine requirements for future buys, provide management
visibility for reliability and make decisions regarding
test termination."
(3) SM-2 Missile [26]. To meet the contractual
MTBF requirement, the contractor established a three-phase
reliability program. One phase of this program is "Reliabil-
ity Growth Monitoring." The procedure that the contractor
set up to accomplish this phase was to plot a predicted growth
curve that the system was expected to take during its develop-
ment. The observed data will be plotted against this predic-
tion to provide the impetus for additional action if it appears
that the MTBF requirement might not be met. This approach is
being taken by the contractor mainly due to another program
in which the MTBF growth was plotted and found to be a useful
management tool. In a conversation with J. C. Bear [27], he
commented that General Dynamics is finding this technique very
useful and feels that the potential is there for a very power-
ful management tool
.
D. THE MANAGEMENT TOOL
It has been shown that a potential management tool exists
in the use of Reliability Growth Curves. Although the major-
ity of the interest to date has been the assessment of reli-
ability growth, interest is beginning to stir in its use as
an estimator of reliability growth of a weapon system. This
is evident by contractual requirements now being imposed by
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the U. S. Army on new weapon system developments, such as their
Stinger program [28].
Present day policies do not provide the program manager
visibility as to the reliability growth of the system. The
manager does not become aware that the system, in its present
design, will not meet the requirements until it is well into
demonstration testing. With a predicted reliability growth
curve, the program manager has the means by which to measure
actual growth and to aid in decision making as to design
changes and testing of the system.
E. IMPLEMENTATION
1. Requirement
The requirement for a "Reliability Growth Curve
Prediction" should be part of the Reliability Program Plan
requirement of the RFP . The requirement could take one of
two forms
:
a. The Navy with their knowledge of the new weapon
system design and development time constraints, could submit
the desired Reliability Growth Curve to which the contractor
could respond as they presently do with the MTBF requirement.
b. The Navy could require that the contractor submit
a "Reliability Growth Curve" as part of their reliability pro-
gram plan.
In either case, because of its sensitivity depending upon the
model used and the factors involved in predicting the curve,
the final Reliability Growth Curve Prediction will be a nego-




In that Reliability Growth Curve Prediction would be
a new management technique, pit-falls should be expected in
the early stages. All factors that affect the prediction and
the exact sensitivity to the different models can only be
learned with use. The following is a listing of several fac-
tors that must be considered in selecting the appropriate
model and the use of Reliability Growth Curve Prediction.
a. Complexity of the weapon system in that it will
have a definite bearing on expected failure rate.
b. Schedule time alloted for development of the sys-
tem. (Short time, you would expect to see a rapid
growth; long time, a more gradual growth.)
c. The various environments that the system is sub-
jected to during development. (Laboratory, con-
tractor field testing, customer testing, etc.)
d. Definition of failure: To avoid discontinuities
in the growth curve, failure definition must remain
constant [27]
.
e. Number of expected failures: This would have a
bearing in selecting the model that would provide




The program manager, today, has no means available to him
to provide visibility with regards to reliability growth.
Reliability prediction provides the manager with the potential
maximum value at that point in time when the prediction is
made. Reliability demonstration provides the manager with the
actual value at the time when the test was conducted. Neither
of these two methods provides the manager with the answer to:
"Is the weapon system going to meet the reliability
requirement?"
The "Reliability Growth Curve Prediction" would provide
the manager with insight as to how the weapon system should
meet the reliability requirement. And when actual data are
plotted and compared to the predicted curve, it would provide
the manager insight to the question: "Is the weapon system
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A REVIEW OF SOME RELIABILITY GROWTH MODELS'
This appendix describes a number of reliability growth
models which
are currently available. Each model is briefly described
including the
basic assumptions that were made in deriving the models.
Technical
references are given for each of these models where a more complete
discussion of the model may be found.
Model 1 . Lloyd and Lipow (see Appendix B, Reference 28) introduced a
reliability growth model for a system which has only one failure mode.
For each trial it is assumed that the probability is a constant that
the system will fail if the failure mode has not been previously
eliminated. If the system does not fail, no corrected action is per-
formed before the next trial. If the system fails, then an attempt is
made to remove the failure mode from the system. The probability of
successfully removing the failure mode is also assumed to be a constant





where A and C are parameters.
Model 2„ Another reliability growth model was considered by Lloyd and
Lipow (see Appendix B, Reference 28) where the development program is
conducted in K stages and on the i-th stage a certain number of systems
are tested. The reliability growth function considered was
R. = R -a/i,
l
where R. is the system reliability during the i-th stage, R^ is the
ultimate reliability as i-><" and a>0 is a parameter. Maximum likelihood
and least squares estimates of R^ and a are given by Lloyd and Lipow
* Ref : Crow, Larry H. Reliability Growth Modeling , US Army Material
System Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Tech Rot 55, 1972.
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along with a lower confidence limit for R...
Model 3. Weiss (see Appendix B, Reference 41) considered a reliability-
growth model where the mean time to failure of a system with exponential
life distribution is increased by removing the observed failure modes.
In particular, he showed that when certain conditions hold, the increase
of the mean time to failure is approximately at a constant percent per
trial. That is, if Q(i) is the mean time to failure of the system at
trial i then 9(i) may be approximated under certain conditions by
9(i) = Ae
,
where A and C are parameters. Note that
0(i+l) = eC0(i).
The maximum likelihood estimates of A and C are given by Weiss.
Model 4 . Wolman (see Appendix B, Reference 42) considered a situation
where the system failures are classified according to two types. The
first type is termed "inherent cause" and the second type is termed
"assignable cause". Inherent cause failures reflect the state-of-the
art and may occur on any trial while assignable cause failures may be
eliminated by corrective action, never to appear again. Wolman assumed
that the number of original assignable cause failures is known and that
whenever one of these modes contribute a failure, the mode is removed
permanently from the system. Wolman uses a Markov-chain approach to
derive the reliability of the system at the n-th trial when the failure
probabilities are known.
Model 5 . Barlow and Scheuer (see Appendix B, Reference 3) considered
a nonparametric model for estimating the reliability of a system during
a development program. They assumed that the design and engineering
changes do not decrease the system's reliability, but, unlike some
other models, they do not fit a prescribed functional form to the
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reliability growth. Their model is similar to V/olman's in that each
failure must be classified either as inherent or assignable cause.
It is further assumed that the development program is conducted in
K stages, with similar systems being tested within each stage. For
each stage, the number of inherent failures, the number of assignable
cause failures and the number of successes are recorded. In addition,
they assumed that the probability of an inherent failure, q , remains
the same throughout the development program and that the probability of
an assignable cause failure, q., in the i-th stage does not increase
from stage to stage of the development program. The authors obtained
the maximum likelihood estimates of q and of the q. T s subject to the
condition that they be nonincreasing. A conservative lower confidence




Virene (see Appendix B, Reference 38) considered the suitability





< b < 1, < c < 1, for reliability growth modeling. In this equation
a is the upper limit approached by the reliability R as the development
time t-*». The parameters a, b and c are unknown. Virene gave estimates




Duane (see Appendix B, Reference 17) considered a deterministic
approach to reliability growth modeling. He analyzed data available
for several systems developed by General Electric in an effort to
determine if any systematic changes in reliability improvement occurred
during the development programs for these systems. His analysis revealed
that for these systems, the cumulative failure rate versus cumulative
operating hours fell close to a straight line when plotted on log-log
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paper. The cumulative failure rate appeared to decrease at approximately
the -0.4 or -0.5 power of cumulative operating hours.
The types of systems investigated were of the complex electro-
mechanical and mechanical nature. Duane concluded that a line with a
slope of -0.5 representing cumulative failure rate as a function of
cumulative operating hours on log- log paper would probably be suitable
for reflecting reliability growth for similar type systems developed at
General Electric.
Mathematically, Duane' s failure rate equation may be expressed by
X(T) = KT~a
,
K > 0, < o < 1, where A (T) is the cumulative failure rate of the
system at operating time T, and K and a are parameters. It
follows then that
XT) = 5EQ.
where E(T) is the expected number of failures the system will
experience during T units of operation. This yields
E(T) = KT 1
" 01
.




For a system with a constant failure rate the mean time between failure
(MTBF) of the system at operating time T is '
^~J_s/~ -z^L^t^-a '
M(T) = [9CT)]" 1 = [U-cOKj-V.






With this notation a » 0.5 closely represented the types of systems
considered by Duane.
Model 8 . Pollock (see Appendix B, Reference 32) considered a Bayesian
reliability growth model for a system undergoing development. The
parameters of the model are assumed to be random variables with
appropriate prior distribution functions. Using his results, one may
project the system reliability to any time after the start of the
development program without data and, also, estimate the system
reliability after data have been observed. He further gave precision
statements regarding the projection and estimation.
Model 9 . Barlow, Proschan and Scheuer (see Appendix B, Reference 2)
considered a reliability growth model which assumes that a system is
being modified at successive stages of development. At stage i the
system reliability (probability of success) is p.. The model of
reliability growth under which one obtains the maximum likelihood
estimates of p. ,p_, ••.,'pv assumes that
Pi <P2 < ••• <PK -
That is, it is required that the system reliability be not degraded
from stage to stage of development. No particular mathematical form
of growth is imposed on the reliability. In order to obtain a con-
servative lower confidence bound on p„, it suffices to require only
that
p > max p .
1<K
That is, it is only necessary that the reliability in the latest stage
of development be at least as high as that achieved earlier in the
development program.
Data consist of x. successes in n. trials in sta^e i i=l k
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A variation of this model is treated in Barlow and Scheuar (see
Model 5). In that model two types of failure, inherent and assignable
cause, are distinguished.
Model 10. Another reliability growth model considered by Barlow,
Proschan and Scheuer (see Appendix c, Reference 2) assumed that at
stage i of development the distribution of system life length is F..'
The model of reliability growth under which the maximum likelihood
estimates of F
,
(t) ,F„(t) ,. .
.





Ct) iF 2 (t) < ... <_ FK (t)
for a fixed t >_ 0. In order to obtain a conservative upper confidence
curve on F„(t) and thereby, a conservative lower confidence curve on




(t) >_ max F. (t)
i<K 1
for all t >_ 0. That is, the probability of system survival beyond any
time t in the latest stage of development is at least as high as that
achieved earlier in the development program.





. Barlow, Proschan and Scheuer (see Appendix C, Reference 2),
also, considered a reliability growth model which assumes that the
system life at the i-th stage of development has increasing failure rata
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Because of improvement from stage to stage
r^t) >.r
2 00 1 ... L rK (t)
for t >_ 0, where r. (t) is the failure rate at time t at the i-th stage
of development. That is, for each t >_ 0, the probability of system
failure in the interval (t, t+dt)
,
given survival till time t, does not
increase from stage to stage of the development program.
Given life-length observations. X.
,
,X.
-, .. ,,X. , the maximum6
' il* i2* 'in'
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